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I. INTRODUCTION
Armed conflict often results in the large-scale exodus of refugees into
politically and economically fragile neighboring states. The burdens on
asylum countries can be extreme, and may only be partly offset by the arrival
of international aid and protection resources. Moreover, difficulties inherent
in the provision of asylum have been exacerbated in recent years by the
increasing disinclination of the wealthier countries that fund the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and most other
assistance agencies to meet the real costs of protection. In such
circumstances, it is unsurprising that as conflicts wind down, host countries
ordinarily seek to bring refugee status to an end, and to commence
repatriations to the country of origin. 1
There are two ways in which states parties to the Refugee Convention
may be relieved of their duty of protection in such situations. First, it may be
the case that a person who is a refugee-that is, who continues to have a
well-founded fear of being persecuted-nonetheless decides to go back to a
country in which the transition to peace and security remains incomplete. In
so doing, the refugee is simply exercising the right of every person to return
to his or her own country. 2 But, as a matter of refugee law, if the voluntary
return amounts to re-establishment in the country of origin, refugee status
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1 "While at the outset of a crisis, international solidarity and assistance are
forthcoming, this support will usually decline the more protracted a refugee situation
becomes. This can lead to 'asylum fatigue', erosion of protection standards and
considerable pressure on the refugee population to depart .. " UNHCR, Voluntary
Repatriation, U.N. GAOR, 3, U.N. Doc. EC/GC0215 (2002) [hereinafter UNHCR,
2002 Note].
2 "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country." G.A.
Res. 2200A/21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 16, at 52, art. 12(4), U.N. Doc. A/6313 (1996) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant]. See also UNHCR, 2002 Note, supra note 1, 1
11.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
comes to an end by operation of Article 1C(4) of the Convention. This rule
makes good sense: The refugee's actions signal that an essential requirement
of refugee status, the presence of the putative refugee outside the territory of
his or her own country, will no longer be satisfied.3
Importantly, though, the simple fact of return to the home country cannot
be relied upon to terminate Convention refugee status.4 Under Article 1C(4),
it is only if and when the refugee is re-established in the country of origin
that refugee status comes to an end.5 Refugees who return to a country
emerging from conflict are therefore afforded a critical source of protection:
Until and unless they establish a durable presence in their home country, they
may elect to return to the asylum state and resume the protection to which
they are entitled there.6
3 An individual qualifies as a refugee under international law only if he or she,
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of nationality .. " Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, art. 1A(2) (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. But
the refugee definition also provides that, "This Convention shall cease to apply to any
person ... [who] has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or
outside of which he remained owing to fear of persecution." Id. at art. 1C(4).
4 This legal conclusion might follow if it is accepted that an individual must be
subjectively fearful of return in order to qualify for Convention refugee status. But see
JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 66-75 (1991) [hereinafter REFUGEE
STATUS] (disputing the notion of a subjective fear requirement).
5 Once re-establishment has occurred, refugee status comes to an end whether or not
the former refugee has, in any meaningful sense, "repatriated" to his or her country of
origin. That is, there is no requirement at law that the result of the return home be the
restoration of a normal relationship between the (former) refugee and the government of
the home state. Repatriation, as Barry Stein has rightly insisted, involves more than just
return: "In many situations, 'repatriation' is the wrong term, because there has been no
restoration of the bond between citizen and fatherland. 'Return' is a better term because it
relates to the fact of going home without judging its content." Barry Stein, Policy
Challenges Regarding Repatriation in the 1990s: Is 1992 the Year for Voluntary
Repatriation? 2 (presented at the Conference on Global Refugee Policy: An Agenda for
the 1990s, Aspen Institute, Feb. 1992).
6 In brief, under Article 1C(4) of the Refugee Convention, the voluntariness of the
return and subsequent re-establishment are essential elements of this solution, both
because they are part of the test for cessation of refugee status under Article 1C(4), and,
more fundamentally, because any mandated return may amount to a breach of the host
state's duty of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. See Refugee
Convention, supra note 3. In view of the right of all individuals to return to their country
of citizenship, the truly voluntary decision of a refugee to become re-established in his or
her state of origin-including to risk his or her life in so doing--does not violate any duty
of the state which has granted protection. But, if return is not really based on the
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The alternative solution of repatriation is available only consequent to a
fundamental change of circumstances in the state of origin. Under Article
1C(5)-(6) of the Refugee Convention, refugee status is lost once the refugee
can no longer claim surrogate international protection, "because the
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist .... -17 Because refugee protection is conceived as
protection for the duration of risk,8 states parties need not honor refugee
refugee's free consent, including in situations where it has been coerced by threat of
sanction or the withdrawal of rights, the duty of non-refoulement is infringed. As such,
the voluntariness of the decision to return must be considered in assessing the legality of
any return in circumstances where refugee status has not come to an end. Importantly,
refugee status does not come to an end simply because a refugee chooses, even with
complete freedom, to return to his or her country of origin. The second requirement for
valid cessation of refugee status is that the refugee be not just physically inside the
country of origin, but rather that he or she be re-established there. The original draft of
this provision, which would have revoked the refugee status of any person who "returns
to his country of former nationality," was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee on the
grounds that it might bar persons who had been forcibly repatriated to their state of
origin, as well as those who had chosen to return to their country of origin only
temporarily. The substitute language, which sets the cessation threshold at voluntary re-
establishment in the country of origin, was thus intended to ensure that only persons who
have willingly resettled in their state of origin are subject to cessation of refugee status.
See generally REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 4, at 197-99.
7 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. lC(5)-(6).
We should not lose sight of the fact that international law concerns the imposition of
obligations on States. It may be in the individual's best interest actually to remain in
the host country and continue his or her life in exile, but is the State obliged to
provide refuge if conditions in the country of origin have become safe within a
reasonable time period? Clearly, States never agreed to such legal obligations ....
Michael Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation when Refugee Protection Is No Longer
Necessary: Moving Forward after the 48th Session of the Executive Committee, 10 INT'L.
J. OF REFUGEE L. 236, 245 (1998).
8 As recently observed in the House of Lords, "[riefugee status is a temporary status
for as long as the risk of persecution remains." R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Yogathas, 1 A.C. 920, 954 (2003) (Lord Scott). More explicitly, the
English Court of Appeal has noted that, "the Convention only requires this country to
grant asylum for so long as the person granted asylum remains a refugee. It would be
enough to satisfy the Convention if the Secretary of State were to grant refugees
temporary leave to remain for so long as their refugee status persisted." Saad v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2001] EWCA Civ 2008 (Eng. C.A.). See generally
James Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT. J. OF REFUGEE L. 551 (1997) (also
published in LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES CONCERNING REFUGEES FROM THE FORMER
YUGOSLAvIA 4-11 (European University Institute ed., 1997)) [hereinafter Meaning of
Repatriation].
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rights once the underlying cause of flight has been extinguished. 9 In such
circumstances, the host government is ordinarily entitled to require the
former refugee to depart from its territory, 10 and to return to his or her state
of origin. Without the protection of refugee law, the individual concerned is
9 This is the most clear in the case of (the overwhelming majority of) refugees who
hold the citizenship of that country, and who lose their refugee status only if the change
of circumstances means that the refugee "can no longer.., continue to refuse to avail
himself of the.protection of the country of his nationality .. " Refugee Convention,
supra note 3, at art. IC(5). In the case of stateless refugees, only the ability to return to
the country of former habitual residence is required for cessation to ensue. Id. at art.
lC(6). Cessation under Article lC(l)-(2), while less common, is similarly predicated on
the re-establishment of a protective bond between the refugee and his or her country of
origin. See REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 4, at 191-97.
10 The situation is somewhat more ambiguous for states parties to the 1969
Organization of African Unity ("OAU") Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force June 20, 1974)
[hereinafter OAU Convention]. While Article 1(4)(e) of that treaty is largely comparable
to the right of cessation due to a fundamental change of circumstances found in the
Refugee Convention, Article 5(1) of the OAU Convention expressly provides that "[t]he
essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no
refugee shall be repatriated against his will." Id. at art. 5(1) (emphasis added). The
African treaty does not make clear how this provision is to be related to the cessation
clauses. On the one hand, the reference to the duty to respect the voluntary character of
repatriation "in all cases" could be read to limit the right of states to repatriate even a
person who is no longer a refugee by virtue of cessation of status. On the other hand, the
final clause more clearly stipulates that the requirement of voluntarism may in fact be
invoked only by a person who is a "refugee," thereby excluding a former refugee whose
status has validly ceased. If read to apply only to present refugees, then the OAU
provision can not only be reconciled to its own cessation clauses, but also be applied in
consonance with Article 1C(4) of the Refugee Convention, which does require voluntary
re-establishment by a person otherwise entitled to refugee status before the duty to
protect him or her comes to an end. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1C(4)
11 While the range of issues to be considered in initially assessing the existence of a
well-founded fear and at the cessation stages is similar, Article 1C(5)-(6) of the Refugeee
Convention nonetheless insists upon a higher standard of scrutiny in the context of
adjudicating cessation. The Canadian Federal Court has sensibly taken the view that
while the criteria for cessation due to changed circumstances are not technically binding
at the time of initial status assessment, nonetheless "when a panel is weighing changed
country conditions, together with all the evidence in an applicant's case, factors such as
durability, effectiveness and substantiality are still relevant. The more durable the
changes are demonstrated to be, the heavier they will weigh against granting the
applicant's claim." Penate v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 79, 95. Accord Villalta v. Canada,
[1993] F.C. 1025 (holding that the cessation criteria "are a small subset of a larger circle
of circumstances in which status will not be found to exist. This small subset is what
must be proven by the government if it wishes to take status away from someone but it
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in the same position as any other non-citizen; he or she is subject to removal,
so long as that can be accomplished without the breach of any relevant norm
of international human rights law. 12 Because the repatriation of the former
refugee cannot by definition involve a risk of refoulementO3 (it having been
found that there is no longer an objective risk of being persecuted in the
country of origin), repatriation does not require the former refugee's
consent. 14
does not control the framework of the analysis... in determining whether status
exists .... I do not mean to suggest that in assessing the significance of changed country
conditions, for the purpose of deciding whether to grant status, the [decisionmaker]
should not consider factors such as the significance, the likely effectiveness, and likely
durability of the changed conditions. But I do not think the [decisionmaker] needs to
apply the more demanding criteria, which it is necessary to meet when one is considering
removal of status .... (emphasis added)).
But see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Betkhoshabeh (1999),
55 A.L.D. 609 (taking the view that there is no difference between the initial test for
determining the existence of a well-founded fear and that for the cessation of refugee
status under Article 1C). In my opinion, because cessation involves the withdrawal of an
acquired status from a refugee-based upon an already proved or assumed risk of being
persecuted-the refugee should be subjected to uprooting and enforced departure only
where there is particularly clear evidence that protection is no longer required. Accord
UNHCR, Note on the Cessation Clauses, U.N. GAOR, 1[ 8, 9, U.N. Doc.
EC/47/SC/CRP.30 (1997) [hereinafter UNHCR, Cessation Note].
Given that the application of the cessation clauses would result in the withdrawal of
refugee status, the clauses should be interpreted in a restrictive way .... UNHCR
recommends that in deciding whether to invoke the cessation clauses, States should
take into account the consequences of cessation of refugee status. Difficulties which
may follow from the invocation of the cessation clauses should be considered in
both the decision and the timing of cessation. In particular, States should avoid a
situation where the former refugee remains in the country of asylum without a
definite legal status or with an illegal status. Human rights factors should be taken
into account as well as previously acquired rights of refugees, particularly in regard
to those who, due to their long stay in the country of asylum, have developed strong
family, social and economic links there.
Id.
12 For a discussion on the limitations on lawful repatriation set by international
human rights law, see infra text accompanying note 117.
13 "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 33(1) (second emphasis
added).
14 Insistence on consent to repatriation could easily grant former refugees what
amounts to a veto over their return to the home state, based on reasons which may have
nothing to do with the criteria for cessation under Article 1C(5)-(6). For example,
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Instead of promoting a clear understanding of the rules governing the
solutions of voluntary re-establishment and of repatriation consequent to a
fundamental change of circumstances, UNHCR routinely speaks instead of
the solution of "voluntary repatriation." The agency's Executive Committee,
for example, has "not[ed] that [while] voluntary repatriation, local integration
and resettlement are the traditional durable solutions for
refugees.... voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, when
feasible."' 15 This trio of solutions-which includes no reference to the
solutions of voluntary re-establishment, or of repatriation as such-is
repeated like a mantra in all agency standard-setting. 16
spokespersons for Chakma refugees from Bangladesh articulated a 13-point charter of
demands before they would agree to go back to Chittagong (in Bangladesh). While many
of the demands related to cessation criteria, others-including compensation for the
refugees, and the eviction of Muslim settlers from traditional tribal lands-did not. THE
TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 17, 1994, cited in B.S. CHIMNI, IACL NATIONAL REPORT FOR INDIA
12 (1994). Moreover, even in the context of decisions regarding the UNHCR mandate
itself, it has been noted that, "the means do not yet exist to enable the wishes and choices
of the refugees themselves to play a decisive part in determining their own future."
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Refugees
Returning Home: Report of the Symposium for the Horn of Africa on the Social and
Economic Aspects of Mass Voluntary Return Movements of Refugees, Addis Ababa, Sept.
15-17, 14 (1993). Accord UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 3:
Cessation of Refugee Status under Articles 1(C)(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/03/03 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines]
("Cessation under Article lC(5) and lC(6) does not require the consent of or a voluntary
act by the refugee. Cessation of refugee status terminates rights that accompany that
status.").
15 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 89, Conclusion on International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at Preamble (2000) (emphasis added). All Executive
Committee Conclusions are available at the UNHCR Executive Committee's website,
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom.
16 See, e.g., UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18, Voluntary
Repatriation, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess. (1980); UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 41, General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess. (1986); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 46, General Conclusion on
International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess. (1987); UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 55, General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess. (1989); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 62, Note on International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess. (1990); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 68, General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. (1992);
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 74, General Conclusion on International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess. (1994); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 79, General Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess. (1996);
180
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
Despite the frequency with which it is championed, "voluntary
repatriation" is in fact a concept derived from the text of the UNHCR
Statute, 17 not from the Refugee Convention which binds states. It arguably
makes sense to limit the agency's mandate to repatriations which are
voluntary' 8 ; given the inability to distinguish dependably between refugees
and others in the context of the complex emergency situations UNHCR
routinely confronts, any other position might well compromise the credibility
of an international organization expressly tasked to promote protection. 19
But, as useful as "voluntary repatriation" is as a construct for the
regulation of UNHCR agency activity, the notion of voluntary repatriation is
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 81, General Conclusion on International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess. (1997); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 85, Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess. (1998);
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 87, General Conclusion on International
Protection, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. (1999); UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion
No. 89, supra note 15; UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 101, U.N. GAOR,
59th Sess. (2004).
17 "The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees falling
under the competence of his Office by... [a]ssisting governmental and private efforts to
promote voluntary repatriation .... G.A. Res. 428(V), Statute of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 20, at 46, art. 8(c),
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter UNHCR, Statute].
18 Id. Beyond its statutory authority, UNHCR may engage in other repatriation
activities only with the authorization of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Id.
at art. 9. The Executive Committee of UNHCR has recently gone beyond this constraint
in a modest way,. calling upon the agency to "tak[e] clear public positions on the
acceptability of return of persons found not to be in need of international protection."
UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 96, Conclusion on the Return of Persons
Found Not to Be in Need of International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., at j(ii)
(2003). The reference to persons not in need of international protection refers, however,
only to persons not initially entitled to recognition of Convention refugee status. See, e.g.,
UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, U.N. GAOR,
51 st Sess. (1996) [hereinafter UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook].
19 See UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 5-8. While this
is undoubtedly a very cautious reading of its authority, UNHCR's disinclination to
become involved in mandated repatriation may well be critical to its ability to secure and
maintain the trust of refugees, and more generally to avoid any possible conflict of
interest with its overarching responsibility to champion the protection of refugees. Article
8(c) of its statute clearly does not prohibit participation by UNHCR in the mandated
repatriation of persons who are no longer refugees, since these persons presumptively
cease to be persons under the competence of UNHCR. UNHCR, Statute, supra note 17,
at art. 6. But, the agency is not expressly authorized to lend its assistance to mandated
repatriation efforts absent authorization from the General Assembly under Article 9. Id. at
art. 9.
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not, in and of itself, legally relevant to the treaty-based duty of protection
which binds governments. While the voluntariness of the repatriation may
well be sufficient to ensure that the state has not breached the duty of non-
refoulement under Article 33,20 cessation of refugee status occurs only when
there is either voluntary re-establishment (not just return), or when
repatriation (whether voluntary or not) has taken place after a fundamental
change of circumstances has been shown to exist in the country of origin.
Indeed, the uneasy relationship between "voluntary repatriation" and the
real solutions open to states parties has recently been tacitly acknowledged
by UNHCR:
While the 1951 Convention ... and its 1967 Protocol do not deal with
voluntary repatriation, the cessation clauses of the Convention have some
relevance to voluntary repatriation, albeit indirectly. Article 1(C)(4) of the
1951 Convention stipulates that refugee status ceases if refugees voluntarily
re-establish themselves in the country of origin. Furthermore, successful
completion of voluntary repatriation programmes often indicates that
circumstances which caused flight no longer exist. This is relevant for the
purposes of declaring general cessation, as foreseen in Article 1(C)(5).
Voluntary repatriation is therefore a process which, ultimately, leads to
cessation of refugee status, be it on an individual basis or on a more general
level. 2 1
Putting to one side the mistaken view that cessation under the Convention
may simply be declared for all members of a given refugee population, 22 this
analysis makes clear that, while voluntary repatriation has relevance to the
question of cessation of status, it is in no sense a substitute for satisfaction of
the true legal requirements set by the Convention.
In practice, however, the near-complete silence of UNHCR on the
20 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 33(1).
21 UNHCR, 2002 Note, supra note 1, 8 (emphasis added).
22 Article 1C(5)-(6) is framed in explicitly individualized terms. It refers, for
example, to the circumstances in connection with which "he" has been recognized, and to
the implausibility of the refugee continuing "to refuse to avail himself" of the state of
origin's protection." Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1C(5)-(6). More
generally, failure to take account of individuated risks, which may continue despite a
generalized absence of risk, could breach Article 33's duty of non-refoulement, which is
also framed in individuated terms, i.e., "where his life or freedom would be threatened."
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 33(1). While states may begin from a general
presumption of absence of risk based on general, group-defined assessments, they must
therefore provide a full and fair opportunity for individual refugees to contest such
presumptions on the basis of the facts of their own particular circumstances.
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normative framework for anything other than "voluntary repatriation" has
proved to be the source of tremendous conceptual incoherence in the refugee
regime. Simply put, repatriation as a solution is simply never discussed by
UNHCR; it always refers to its agency-based standard, "voluntary
repatriation." Indeed, the legality of mandated repatriation is barely
acknowledged. Ironically, even as the agency has elaborated the
requirements for cessation of refugee status due to a fundamental change of
circumstances, it has not gone on to make the obvious linkage between
satisfaction of the test for cessation of status under Article 1C(5)-(6) and the
right of states parties to require repatriation of former refugees to their
country of origin, 23 much less has UNHCR engaged in the critical
complementary analysis of the legal constraints which define the conditions
under which lawful, mandated repatriation may take place.
In the result, states seeking to exercise their right to require former
refugees to repatriate are left in a conceptual void. While the Convention
clearly contemplates a right to bring refugee status to an end, with or without
the assent of the persons concerned, that solution is not recognized as such
by the agency appointed to oversee implementation of the Convention, 24 and
all relevant standards consistently speak not to repatriation justified by a
fundamental change of circumstances, but only to "voluntary repatriation."
How exactly are states to proceed?
The purpose of this article is squarely to confront this dilemma. For the
reasons set out above, states have the right to enforce the repatriation of
former refugees once a fundamental change of circumstances is in place.
That process need not be voluntary. 25 Indeed, as Barutciski has rightly
23 UNHCR indirectly recognizes the legality of mandated repatriation by observing
that valid cessation of refugee status under Article lC(5)-(6) involves "loss of refugee
status and the rights that accompany that status, and it may contemplate the return of
persons to their countries of origin." UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra
note 14, 125.
24 "The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees... in the exercise of its functions, and shall in
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this
Convention." Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 35(1).
25 Accord Barutciski, supra note 7, at 249.
[T]he concept of voluntary repatriation is incoherent if taken as a legally binding
standard. Its value appears in terms of recommending that a State take into account
the individual's desire to return home. Although this is undoubtedly a reasonable
recommendation, it cannot be a coherent legally binding standard according to
international principles of refugee protection.
Id.
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observed, "The promotion of involuntary repatriation if and when refugee
protection ceases to be necessary is a pragmatic approach that represents an
acceptable compromise between legitimate State concerns and the protection
needs of refugees." 26 If states are to be persuaded not to pander to the often
powerful political, economic, and social imperatives bluntly to force refugees
to leave their territory-a particularly acute risk when large groups arrive
during times of armed conflict-then more than ritualistic invocation of the
duty of non-refoulement is called for. There must instead be real clarity about
the legal standard which governs mandated repatriation.
It may be that UNHCR's decision to speak only about "voluntary
repatriation" is based on a well-meaning hope that its silence on mandated
repatriation will induce states to avoid that solution. But the analysis below
suggests that the failure to elaborate the circumstances under which refugees
may be required to go home has had the opposite consequence, including the
forcible return of persons who remain entitled to refugee status. Of perhaps
greatest concern, recent moves to require states to take their cue from
UNHCR on the timing of repatriation and even on the propriety of cessation
of refugee status are likely simply to add to the conceptual confusion which
already exists.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS
The critical groundwork upon which to build a legal framework for
mandated repatriation is in place. As framed by UNHCR, there are three
requirements for deeming Convention refugee status to have ceased by
reason of a change of circumstances. 27 The first requirement is that the
change in the country of origin be genuinely fundamental.28 Second, it must
be enduring.29 Third, it must result not just in the eradication of a well-
founded fear of being persecuted, but also in the restoration of protection.30
Taken together, these tests give substance to the UNHCR Executive
Committee's view that the cessation of refugee status is warranted only
26 Id. at 254.
27 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 91 10-16. This
language is an overall improvement on the test which I proposed-namely, that the
change be "of substantial political significance[,] ... truly effective[,] ... [and] shown to
be durable." REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 4, at 200-02. In particular, the insistence on a
restoration of protection gives clearer guidance on the meaning of effectiveness.
28 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 91 10-12.
2 9 Id. H 12-14.
30 Id. 91 15-16.
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"where a change of circumstances in a country is of such a profound and
enduring nature that refugees from that country no longer require
international protection and can no longer continue to refuse to avail
themselves on the protection of their country ....
This cautious approach to cessation is very much in line with the
intentions of the drafters of the Refugee Convention, who showed no
inclination to authorize the withdrawal of refugee status on the basis of
changes that are insufficiently fundamental to justify the conclusion that "the
circumstances in connection with which [a refugee] has been
recognized... have ceased to exist ... .-"32 Indeed, the type of circumstance
which they had in mind in proposing Article 1C(5)-(6) was the reversion of a
totalitarian state to democratic governance:
To take the case of the aged belonging to the hard core of refugees, it could
hardly be agreed that the government of a country which had returned to
democratic ways should fail to take over the burden of that category of
refugees .... [France] was quite prepared to continue to assist such
refugees so long as such assistance was necessary. But if their country
reverted to a democratic regime, the obligation to assist them should not fall
perforce upon the French Government .... France merely said that she did
not wish to be under an obligation to continue to provide assistance to
refugees who could seek the protection of their country of origin.33
To meet the first requirement of "fundamental change," UNHCR has
opined that:
A complete political change remains the most typical situation in which this
cessation clause has been applied. Depending on the grounds for flight,
significant reforms altering the basic legal or social structure of the State
may also amount to fundamental change, as may democratic elections,
declarations of amnesties, repeal of oppressive laws[,] and dismantling of
former security services. 34
Caution of this kind is appropriate in order to ensure that a refugee's life not
31 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 65, General Conclusion on
International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at (q) (1991), aff'd, UNHCR,
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69, Cessation of Status, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.
(1992).
32 Refugee Convention, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
33 Statement of Mr. Rochefort of France, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.28, at 12-14
(July 19, 1951).
34 UNHCR, Cessation Note, supra note 11, 20.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
be disturbed simply because there is evidence of movement in a peaceful or
rights-regarding direction; the basic reforms must rather be in place before
cessation is contemplated. Thus, for example, the German Administrative
Court in 1992 refused to recognize a fundamental change of circumstances in
Romania-where the Communist era secret police had been re-established-
in contrast to the more radical structural reforms undertaken in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which were appropriately considered of
sufficient magnitude to justify a cessation inquiry.35
The fundamental nature of a reform is moreover not a function simply of
its social and political significance. Rather, it must also be determined that
whatever changes have occurred genuinely "address the causes of
displacement which led to the recognition of refugee status." 36 Even major
political reforms do not warrant cessation unless they are causally connected
to the risk upon which refugee status was recognized, or could presently be
justified. Clearly, whatever general view may be taken of the significance of
a change of circumstances must be tested by reference to the particularized
circumstances of the applicant:
[W]hen one says that "change" in circumstances is an important
consideration, one is not speaking of any change. The [decisionmaker] must
not be content in simply noting that changes have taken place, but must
assess the impact of those changes on the person of the applicant.37
The importance of contemplating cessation only when there is evidence
of fundamental change-in the sense that it is both truly significant and
substantively relevant-is closely connected to the second requirement: The
reform must be shown to be enduring. In the case of an Indian Sikh at risk
under the regime of Indira Gandhi, for example, a reviewing court was
satisfied that a relevant change of circumstances had occurred because "six
years had passed since the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the incidents of
35 Federal Republic of Germany Administrative Court, Ansbach, Dec. No.
AN17K91.42844 (1992), reported as Abstract No. JRU0193 in 6 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE
L. 282 (1994); see also Nkosi v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 629 (declining to refuse refugee
status on the basis of a "hesitant and equivocal finding that certain limited changes in
circumstances in Zaire had occurred .... ").
36 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 10. "Fundamental
changes are considered as effective only if they remove the basis of the fear of
persecution; therefore, such changes must be assessed in light of the particular cause of
fear, so as to ensure that the situation which warranted the grant of refugee status has
ceased to exist." UNHCR, Cessation Note, supra note 11, 19.
37 Arggello-Garcia v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 635.
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alleged persecution, and.., a new government was in place in India."
38
While 12 to 18 months since a fundamental reform is argued by UNHCR to
be the minimum time which should elapse before cessation is
contemplated, 39 the more basic rule is "that all developments which would
appear to evidence significant and profound changes be given time to
consolidate before any decision on cessation is made."
40 Because the
progress of consolidation is context-specific, the time required to establish
the durability of change will inevitably be longer where the reform was the
result of conflict,41 and hence less likely to be quickly and whole-heartedly
embraced by all:
Occasionally, an evaluation as to whether fundamental changes have taken
place on a durable basis can be made after a relatively short time has
elapsed. This is so in situations where, for example, the changes are
peaceful and take place under a constitutional process, where there are free
and fair elections with a real change of government committed to respecting
fundamental human rights, and where there is relative political and
economic stability in the country.
A longer period of time will need to have elapsed before the durability of
change can be tested where the changes have taken place violently, for
instance, through the overthrow of a regime. Under the latter circumstances,
the human rights situation needs to be especially carefully assessed. The
process of national reconstruction must be given sufficient time to take hold
and any peace arrangements with opposing militant groups must be
38 Virk v. Canada, [19921 F.C. 119.
39 As noted by UNHCR,
In the Discussion Note on the Application of the 'Ceased Circumstances' Cessation
Clause in the 1951 Convention (EC/SCP/1992/CRP.1), it was advocated that a
period of twelve to eighteen months elapse after the occurrence of profound changes
before such a decision is made. It is UNHCR's recommendation that this period be
regarded as a minimum for assessment purposes. Recent applications of the
cessation clause by UNHCR show that the average period is around four to five
years from the time fundamental changes commenced.
UNHCR, Cessation Note, supra note 11, 121.
40 Id.
41 As such, cessation should clearly not be contemplated simply because there is
presently peace in an area previously prone to conflict. This point was neatly made by the
Federal Court of Canada. "The very article in The Economist cited by the
Idecisionmaker] states merely, 'for now there is peace... ' leaving it an open question to
the reader how long this status quo will last. Given this result, we do not find it necessary
to consider the other matters raised .... Abarajithan v. Canada, [1992] F.C. 54.
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carefully monitored. 42
Third and most important, the fundamental and durable reform must be
shown to have dependable, practical protection consequences. In many cases,
courts have shown an unhealthy willingness to defer to formal evidence of
fundamental change without carefully assessing the resultant ground
reality.4 3 For example, the fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia,an the
existence of a formal cease-fire in Somalia,45 as well as the signing of peace
42 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, H 13-14. In contrast,
for example, refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo were told to prepare for
return only two months after the signing of a peace accord. DRC Refugees Reluctant to
Go Home, THE DAILY NEWS (Zimb.), Oct. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/n-igrationnews/2002/oct.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
The result of a premature termination of refugee status may simply be that refugees end
up coming back to the former host state, as was the case for many Burundians removed
from Tanzania who were forced once more to flee fighting between the government and
rebel forces. Hundreds More Flee Burundi as Conflict Escalates, IRIN, Oct. 2, 2002,
available at http://irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=30203 (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
Alternatively, they may feel compelled to seek protection in another state party, as was
the case for Rwandans deported from Tanzania, many of whom then sought asylum in
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Hit by Influx of Refugees, THE DAILY NEWS (Zimb.), Feb. 15,
2003, available at http://www.queensu.calsamp/migrationnews/20O3/feb.htm (last visited
Aug. 11, 2004).
43 Governments may also. focus unduly on the formalities of change. Australian
immigration minister Philip Ruddock was quoted in April 2003 as having said that
"'Australia has no obligation to take into account the safety of [Iraq] when it comes to
returning the refugees,"' despite the fact that the military victory was not yet
consolidated, and the political transition barely commenced. Greg Barns, Sheik's Advice
for Howard and Bush, CANBERRA TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A-15, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Allnws File.
44 "The Mengistu regime has fallen. The successor government stated that its aim
was a 'broad-based transitional government, representative of Ethiopia's various tribes
and factions, as a prelude to fair elections and multi-party democracy."' Canadian
Immigration and Refugee Board, Dec. No. U91-05190 (Feb. 21, 1992), at 113-14.
45 Despite its recognition of the need to avoid the premature determination of
durability of change, the Full Federal Court of Australia nonetheless deferred to a
determination by the tribunal that a Somali claim could be dismissed on the grounds that
a cease-fire in the civil war in that country had been announced by warlords eleven days
prior to the hearing. Ahmed v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(1999), 55 A.L.D. 618. Justice Branson, however, took serious issue with this approach:
First, the cease-fire upon which the Tribunal placed reliance was of recent
origin .... A conclusion by a decision-maker as to the likely effectiveness of the
cease-fire, having regard to the preceding seven years of civil war in Somalia, called
for some caution. Secondly, the material before the Tribunal upon which it based its
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accords in El Salvador 46 and Guatemala 47 have all been treated as a sufficient
basis to find the need for refugee status to have dissipated. Other courts,
however, have properly insisted on the need for patience before finding a
fundamental reform to be relevant to the cessation of refugee status.48 The
Federal Court of Canada thus reversed a decision to deny refugee status to an
Iranian applicant on the basis of political reforms in that country, it having
been determined that the reforms had not, in fact, put an end to the practice
of politically inspired arrests and executions.49
This qualitative dimension of effective reform has recently been
helpfully described by UNHCR as linked to the core concern of the refugee
definition itself-namely whether it can truly be said that the refugee can
presently "avail himself of the protection" of his or her home state:
conclusion that peace had existed in Somalia since January 31, 1998 was, at best,
tentative in character.
Id.
46 As one court said,
The documentary evidence describes the peace accord and provides details with
respect to its implementation and progress. It is a fact that some documentary
evidence also shows that the changes in El Salvador are conservative in nature and
that human rights abuses continue. However, it is apparent to me that the Board
concluded that as a result of the changed circumstances the Applicant as a union
member no longer had cause for a well-founded fear of persecution, and I believe it
was open to the Board on the evidence before it to conclude as it did.
Caballos v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 623.
47 See, e.g., Gomez Garcia v. INS, 187 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1999); Anibal Mazariegos
v. INS, 241 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2001).
48 In response to the claim of a Ugandan Arab, the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board had determined that the Ugandan government "intended to restore
democracy, the rule of law[,] and respect for human rights." Ahmed v. Canada, [1993]
F.C. 1035. In response, the Federal Court noted succinctly that, 'These may well have
been Museveni's intentions, but these intentions have not materialized." Id. Similarly, in
rejecting the sufficiency of the fall of the Siad Barr6 regime in Somalia as a basis for
finding there to have been a fundamental and durable change of circumstances, the same
court observed that, "That finding ... must be linked with their further finding that the
country continues to be divided along tribal lines and to be torn by civil war." Abdulle v.
Canada, [1992] F.C. 67. In a particularly succinct rebuke of the official propensity to seek
premature revocation of status, the Federal Court of Canada observed that, "If the
political climate in a country changes to the extent that it adversely affects the status of a
refugee, the Minister may make an application to... determine whether the person has
ceased to be a Convention refugee. Presumably, the Minister would only seek such a
determination after monitoring the effects of any political change in the subject country."
Salinas v. Canada, [1992] F.C. 231.
49 Oskoy v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 644.
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In determining whether circumstances have changed so as to justify
cessation under Article 1C(5) or (6), another crucial question is whether the
refugee can effectively re-avail him- or herself of the protection of his or
her own country. Such protection must therefore be effective and available.
It requires more than mere physical security or safety. It needs to include
the existence of a functioning government and basic administrative
structures, as evidenced for instance through a functioning system of law
and justice, as well as the existence of adequate infrastructure to enable
residents to exercise their rights, including their right to a basic livelihood.
An important indicator in this respect is the general human rights situation
in the country .... 50
AS such, it is not sufficient to find simply that the fundamental and
durable reform has eliminated the particular well-founded fear of the refugee.
Cessation is warranted only if and when an affirmative situation has been
established, namely the "restoration of protection" 5 1 to the refugee. In line
with this approach, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination adopted the view that "refugees... have, after their return to
their homes of origin, the right to participate fully and equally in public
affairs at all levels and to have equal access to public services and to receive
rehabilitation assistance." 52 Equally important, the principle that protection
must actually be "available" ensures that refugee status cannot be withdrawn
in circumstances where the country of origin refuses to readmit the individual
concerned.5 3 For example, Bhutan has questioned the citizenship of many
50 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 9J 15-16.
51/d.
52 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
General Recommendation XXII, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 18, at para. 2(d), U.N. Doc.
A/51/18 (1996). Thus, for example, it is doubtful that protection was re-established while
reliance continued to be placed on Bosnian war-time property legislation, which
effectively precluded the return by refugees to their pre-1992 homes. Two Years After
Dayton: A View from Bosnia's Ombudsperson, 22 FORCED MIGRATION MONrrOR 1 (Mar.
1998) available at http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/mar98.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2004).
53 According to the Executive Committee,
In some cases, persons who are not in need of international protection can,
nonetheless, not be returned to their country. Return may be impossible even for
those who did not leave for refugee-related reasons. Countries of origin may refuse
to readmit nationals who do not volunteer to return, or who do not apply for travel
documents; in some cases, the authorities may deny that the individual is their
national, a dispute which may be difficult to resolve.
UNHCR, Return of Persons Not in Need of International Protection: Report of the
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, at para. 7, U.N. Doc.
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Bhutanese refugees awaiting repatriation from Nepal, in consequence of
which they have been unable to return for more than a decade.54 There
clearly has been no restoration of protection in such circumstances, and
hence refugee status should not be deemed to have come to an end.
IH. THE FAILURE TO LINK CESSATION TO THE RIGHT OF MANDATED
REPATRIATION
The right of states parties to undertake mandated repatriation follows
quite directly from satisfaction of the criteria just described. In short, any
person who previously benefited from Convention refugee status, but whose
status has ceased in accordance with Article 1C(5)-(6), may lawfully be
required to depart that state's territory. The only qualification on this right is
the duty of the state to meet other requirements of international human rights
law, including during the process of effecting removal. In particular, account
must be taken'of the former refugee's rights to security of person; to be free
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and not to be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her family life. The nature of
these requirements is described below.55
In practice, however, a Convention-based understanding of repatriation
has yet to emerge. At one level, this is simply a reflection of practical reality
that UNHCR, rather than states, has managed the overwhelming majority of
repatriations of former refugees to date. Because most repatriations involve
returns from one less developed country to another, poorer host states lacking
the resources to effectuate repatriation on their own have generally turned to
UNHCR to underwrite and/or conduct the repatriation effort.56 When it
EC/46/SC/CRP.36 (1996). In the context of Bosnia, the High Representative reported that
the rate of refugee return was dramatically slowed by both legal and bureaucratic
impediments. "Closing loopholes in property legislation and firing foot-dragging officials
(I removed 22 in one day alone) boosted the rate of minority returns .... Wolfgang
Petritsch, In Bosnia, An 'Entry Strategy', WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at A-15.
54 After many rounds of talks, only about 2.5% of the population seeking
repatriation has been recognized by Bhutan as having its citizenship, and hence entitled to
return. Nepal: Bhutanese Refugees Rendered Stateless, Leading Global NGOs Criticize
Screening Process, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 18, 2003. As Jesuit Refugee Service
explained, "More than 70% [of the refugees] were classed as Category 2 or voluntary
migrants, who would have to re-apply for citizenship if they wished to return; and this
would involve a two-year probation period, following which their chances of being
accepted as Bhutanese citizens are unclear." 135 JRS DISPATCHES, July 1, 2003.
55 See infra text accompanying note 116 for an elaboration of the implications of
these duties.
56 In 2002, for example, the governments of Burundi and Tanzania announced that
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chooses to participate, UNHCR understandably takes the view that it must
operate in line with what it reads as its statutory mandate to effect only
voluntary repatriation.57 The fiscal reality in much of the less developed
world has thus meant that the dominant standard for repatriation is not truly
Convention-based at all, but is rather structured to meet the requirements of
UNHCR's institutional mandate to undertake only repatriation that is
"voluntary,"58 and which can be accomplished "in safety and with dignity. '59
Yet when states do become directly involved in repatriations, the
overwhelming dominance of the UNHCR's agency-based approach means
that they do so without any clear guidance on the scope of their authority.
There is no clear, internationally endorsed framework which distinguishes
between the right of states to undertake repatriation under the terms of the
Convention (which is constrained principally by considerations of risk and
the availability of protection, but not of voluntariness) and the institutional
they would "send a delegation -to UNHCR headquarters in Geneva to petition for
allowing repatriation to all areas in Burundi... [A UNHCR spokesperson] said that at a
recent tripartite meeting, a request had been made to the U.N. for funding to allow both
governments to conduct the repatriations themselves." Dwindling Numbers of Refugees
Opting for Repatriation, IRIN, July 8, 2002.
57 As Zieck has observed, "In comparison to the time when 'voluntary repatriation'
functioned predominantly in the form of the possibility, to refuse repatriation, as an
eligibility criterion in order to protect those who were considered to have valid reasons
against returning, 'voluntary repatriation' now functions as a mode of cessation of
refugee status." MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEEs: A LEGAL ANALYSIs 430 (1997). The historical reasons for undue attention
being paid to UNHCR's approach to repatriation, in contrast to the development of an
authentic understanding of repatriation based upon the terms of the Refugee Convention
itself, are set out in Meaning of Repatriation, supra note 8.
58 See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, General Principles Relating to
the Promotion of Refugee Repatriation (1992), at princ. 3 (insisting erroneously that,
"Refugee repatriations must be voluntary"). Rather than insisting on voluntariness as a
legal requirement, the more defensible position is to refer to its logic as a barometer of
protection. Amnesty International, for example, has sensibly suggested that a focus on
voluntariness
helps ensure that refugees' rights and dignity are respected. It increases the
likelihood that the returning population will be able to successfully reintegrate and
rebuild. Voluntariness also recognizes that it is refugees themselves who are
generally the best judges of whether conditions have become sufficiently safe in the
country of origin. In that respect it plays an important protection role.
Amnesty International, Great Lakes Region: Still in Need of Protection: Repatriation,
Refoulement and the Safety of Refugees and the Internally Displaced, at 4, A.I. Doc. No.
AFR/02/07/97 (1997) [hereinafter Amnesty Great Lakes Report].
59 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18.
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mandate of the UNHCR. In such circumstances, protection risks can arise.
In particular, the pattern of state practice in much of the less developed
world is for governments to take UNHCR involvement in the repatriation of
a given refugee population as a sufficient imprimatur for the termination of
their own duty to protect the refugees in question, with no real attention
being paid to the criteria for cessation of status that actually bind them.
UNHCR's institutional decision to commence "voluntary repatriation" is
treated in practice as supplanting the state's duty to apply the relatively
demanding cessation criteria of the Convention. This confusion of state
duties with UNHCR's agency-based approach would be of little moment if
states engaged only in truly voluntary repatriation efforts. But there are, in
fact, too many instances where governments simplistically treat UNHCR's
commencement of voluntary repatriation activities as a signal to undertake
their own, frequently less than truly voluntary, repatriation programs. And
regrettably, UNHCR may become implicated in such efforts.
In an extreme case, the Tanzanian government announced in early
December 1996 that, "'all Rwandese refugees in Tanzania are expected to
return home by 31 December 1996."'60 This announcement, "endorsed and
co-signed by the UNHCR,"' 6 1 resulted in the return of more than 500,000
refugees within the month.62 The criteria for cessation under Article 1C(5)-
(6) could not possibly have been met in the circumstances-fair trials were
only beginning in Rwanda, disappearances and deliberate killings were
continuing there, and there was no reason to believe that the country could
meet the basic needs of the returning refugees. 63 Again, in 2002, UNHCR
announced that it had received "assurances [from] the Tanzanian and
Rwandan governments that security in Rwanda had improved,"64 and
60 Amnesty Great Lakes Report, supra note 58, at 2.
61 UNHCR pronounced itself satisfied that the returns were in fact voluntary despite
solid evidence to the contrary. See id.
62 "Initially tens of thousands of refugees fled the [Tanzanian'] camps and attempted
to move further into Tanzania, in the hope of reaching neighboring countries. The
Tanzanian security forces intercepted the fleeing refugees and 'redirected' them towards
the Rwandese border .... Reports now indicate that some refugees who refuse to go
back are being arrested and held in a detention camp .... Other refugees who wished to
remain were undoubtedly forced back in the rush." Id. at 2. Importantly, it was only after
the returns occurred that UNHCR "expressed hope that Tanzania [would] institute a
screening procedure to evaluate the claims of individuals too fearful to return." Id.
63 Id. at 5-6.
64 Focus on Rwanda Refugees in Tanzania, IRIN, May 9, 2002 (emphasis added). It
is noteworthy that at this time the training of judges who would preside over the trial of
persons accused of all but the highest category of genocide crimes had only been
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sanctioned the voluntary repatriation of the remaining 20,000 Rwandan
refugees living in Tanzania. 65 Yet, even the spokesperson for a partner
agency participating in the ensuing "voluntary" repatriation conceded that the
repatriation actually conducted by Tanzania relied upon an "impetus" in the
form of "verbal pressure" 66-in particular, a firm, year-end deadline for the
refugees' departure.67 In at least some instances, officials implementing the
program used brute force to compel even long-term Rwandan residents to
leave the country. 68
As the Tanzanian example makes clear, the risks of state reliance on
UNHCR involvement as a signal to commence their own repatriation efforts
are exacerbated by the fairly routine involvement of the agency in promoting
repatriation before the requirements of the Convention's change of
commenced. It was therefore not surprising that Rwandan refugees continued to express
grave reservations about the practical efficacy of commitments to protect them from
retaliation., Id.
65 Rwandan Refugees to be Out by December 31, THE EAST AFRICAN, Oct. 14, 2002.
66 Thousands More Refugees Seek Repatriation, IRIN, Jan. 9, 2002 (quoting Mark
Wigley, deputy director of Norwegian People's Aid). In the context of a subsequent
effort by Tanzania to repatriate refugees to Burundi, a consortium of U.S.-based non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) called upon the Tanzanian government to "cease
placing political and psychological pressure" on the refugees to return. NGOs Concerned
Over Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees, IRIN, May 15, 2002.
67 Indeed,
[n]ewspapers in Eastern Africa have reported that Tanzania will forcibly send 2,000
Rwandan refugees living in the camps in western Tanzania back to Rwanda. The
2,000 are those who refused to return home during the recent voluntary repatriation,
citing insecurity in their home country as the reason for remaining .... The feeling
in the Tanzanian government is that there is no need for the refugees to remain
because the security situation in Rwanda is now stable. Earlier this month,
Tanzania's Home Affairs Minister, Mr. Omar Ramadhan Mapuri[,] warned that
Tanzania might be forced to repatriate all the refugees living in the country if the
international community does not intervene in the serious food crisis facing the
refugees.
127 JRS DISPATCHES, Feb. 28, 2003.
68 According to one news report,
The President of the National Repatriation Commission ... [said] that the move by
the Tanzanian government had caught more than the evictees by surprise. 'We had
not anticipated this. We asked them to stop the process for some time so that we can
talk with them and work out the modalities of how it should be done'....
[Tanzanian ambassador to Rwanda] Mwakalindile admits that the forced repatriation
may not have been handled appropriately.
Forced to Go Home: Rwandan Immigrants in Tanzania, INTERNEWS, Apr. 15, 2003.
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
circumstances cessation clause are met.6 9 Indeed, UNHCR's Executive
Committee has instructed the agency that:
From the outset of a refugee situation, the High Commissioner should at all
times keep the possibility of voluntary repatriation for all or part of a group
under active review and the High Commissioner, whenever he deems that
the prevailing circumstances are appropriate, should actively pursue the
promotion of this solution. 70
In reliance on this instruction, UNHCR has adopted a spectrum of
institutional positions on repatriation, which explicitly includes the
facilitation of return "even where UNHCR does not consider that,
objectively, it is safe for most refugees to return"7 1:
While the condition of fundamental change of circumstances in the country
of origin will usually not be met in such situations, UNHCR may consider
facilitating return in order to have a positive impact on the safety of
refugees/returnees as well as to render assistance which the refugees may
require in order to return. Such assistance may have to be given in the
absence of formal guarantees or assurances by the country of origin for the
safety of repatriating refugees, and without any agreement or understanding
having been concluded as to the basic terms and conditions of return. 7 2
Indeed, UNHCR as an agency will, on occasion, be under pressure to
proceed quickly to repatriate refugees, 73 particularly where there is a
perceived need to be supportive of more broadly based political and social
transitions. For example, Mafwe refugees from Namibia anxious for their
69 For example, UNHCR justified its facilitation of repatriation to northern Burundi
in 2002 on the grounds that the region (though not the country as a whole) was "deemed
relatively secure." Dwindling Numbers of Refugees Opting for Repatriation, supra note
56. The agency launched a repatriation exercise for refugees in Zambia "because the
peace process[es] in war-tom neighbouring countries are progressing well." UNHCR to
Begin Repatriation of Refugees in Zambia, ZAMBEZI TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002 (quoting
UNHCR Country Representative, Ahmed Gubartala).
70 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40, Voluntary Repatriation, U.N.
GAOR, 40th Sess., at (e) (1985).
71 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 15.
72 Id.
73 UNHCR has recently acknowledged that, at times, it promotes voluntary
repatriation "when the life or physical integrity of refugees in the country of asylum is
threatened to the point that return is the safer option." UNHCR, 2002 Note, supra note 1,
at para. 29(iv).
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security by reason of their pro-secessionist activities were assured by
UNHCR that they should accept repatriation because the situation in
Namibia was "calm," and the Namibian government deserved "'a pat on the
back.' ' 74 Similarly, UNHCR launched a regional initiative in 2003 to
promote the voluntary repatriation of some 500,000 Angolan refugees from
Zambia, Namibia, and Democratic Republic of Congo. The exercise-styled
as "organized voluntary repatriation" 75-was predicated on the existence of
"current peace" 76 in a country just emerging from more than a quarter-
century of civil war, and UNHCR's view that "acceptable conditions"77
prevailed there. While promoted as integral to the success of a national
reconstruction program for Angola,78 some refugees were deeply opposed to
the initiative, particularly in view of the disastrous attempt to promote their
repatriation based upon another cease-fire in 1994.79 Clearly, no sound case
74 Scared Refugees Reluctant to Return Home, AFRICAN CHURCH INFORMATION
SERVICE, Mar. 24, 2003 (quoting Cosmos Chanda, UNHCR representative to Botswana).
75 Authorities Sign Repatriation Accords with Zambia and Namibia, ANGOLA PRESS
AGENCY, Nov. 28, 2002.
76 Angolan Refugees Leave for Home in May, TIMES OF ZAMBIA, Mar. 5-13, 2003
(quoting Zambian Home Affairs Permanent Secretary, Peter Mumba). Not even UNHCR
appears to have believed that a definitive peace had been established when the promotion
of repatriation was agreed to. UNHCR spokesperson Lucia Teoli observed that,
"Previous attempts to bring people back home failed because of the ongoing war, but
since the cease-fire in April, most people and leaders believe that peace is irreversible in
the country. The UNHCR is optimistic about this attempt." First Wave of Angolan
Refugees to Go Home Next Year, IRIN, Nov. 28, 2002 (emphasis added).
77 UNHCR Prepares to Start Repatriating Angolans, THE NAMIBIAN, Apr. 23, 2003
(quoting an interview with UNHCR Senior Protection Officer, Magda Medina, and
Public Information Officer, David Nthengwe).
7 8 Angola-Zambia: UNHCR Addresses Returnee Concerns of Landmines and
Hunger, IRIN, Mar. 14, 2003 (quoting UNHCR regional spokesperson, Fidelis Swai).
79 Angolan Refugees Reluctant to Return Rome, TIMES OF ZAMBIA, Mar. 18-26,
2003.
Most refugees from the former Portuguese colony are reluctant to go back to
the land of their forefathers unless they are assured of a durable cease-fire between
Unita and the MPLA- government. Even the news that former Unita leader Jonas
Savimbi is dead and buried, and [that] the country is on a reconstruction course, is
not good enough to convince them. But you would not blame them entirely for
dragging their feet over their return to their homeland. Their fears may be well-
founded .... [Some] are jittery [because] someone told them in 1994, shortly after
the Lusaka Peace Protocol was signed between Unita and the MPLA government,
that there was peace in Angola and they, therefore, could return to their country.
They are fearful because most of those, if not all, who returned received a rude
shock when they were greeted with barrels of guns.
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could be made that conditions in either Namibia or Angola had yet reached
the point that states parties could validly deem their refugee status to have
come to an end.
Even less happily, UNHCR's determination to end its mandate in
relation to particular refugee groups, and to promote their repatriation, may at
times reflect no more than the need to reduce long-term care expenditures in
an era of shrinking budgets, financial insecurity, and increased political
pressure from states. 80 Indeed, the Angolan repatriation was reported to have
been driven in part by concerns "to ease logistical pressure on both the [host]
government[s] and UNHCR, which have had to look after a rapidly
expanding refugee population in a time of dwindling resources."81 More
clearly still, UNHCR's decision to end assistance to, and step-up the
voluntary repatriation of, Muslim Rohingya refugees to Burma-despite the
continued reality of grave and systematic discrimination, including the denial
to them of citizenship-really cannot be explained on protection grounds. 82
There is, of course, no valid legal justification for state invocation of
UNHCR's authorization of voluntary repatriation to effect what amounts in
practice to involuntary repatriation. But it remains that the ability of states to
avoid the more exacting requirements for cessation of status, which in fact
bind them, has been facilitated by UNHCR's failure to articulate the
differences between its institutional role in repatriation and the distinct
requirements for mandated return consequent to valid cessation of status,83
Id.
80 As Amnesty International noted in a stinging critique of UNHCR's decision to
assist Tanzania's December 1996 enforced repatriation of Rwandans, "That [protection]
oversights were possible, were legitimized by UNHCR, and were so readily accepted by
the international community speaks volumes. Does the world remain committed to
protecting refugees, or do we now emphasize return, for political and financial reasons,
over safety?" Amnesty Great Lakes Report, supra note 58, at 3.
81 40,000 Refugees Return Home from Zambia, ZAMBEZI TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004.
82 Lack of Protection Plagues Burma's Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, May 30, 2003.
While conditions for Rohingya inside Burma have hardly changed in the last
decade, what appears to have changed is UNHCR's policy towards Rohingya
concerning rights to UNHCR protection and support. By stepping up repatriation
efforts and reducing assistance to refugees[,] ... UNHCR has created an
environment in which protection for the Rohingya is virtually untenable.
Id.
83 Even as UNHCR has acknowledged the difference between its institutional
standards for voluntary repatriation and the right of states to invoke the cessation clauses,
its own language contributes to confusion on this point. See, e.g., UNHCR, Ceased
Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 1 29.
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and rigorously to supervise the application of those standards. 84 The question
then arises: Why would UNHCR not speak directly to the issue of mandated
repatriation, and insist upon respect for Convention obligations?
IV. THE RISKS OF INSTITUTIONAL OVERREACHING
The marginal influence of Convention-based standards is not simply the
result of the de facto dominance of UNHCR in repatriation practice, nor even
of states seeking to avoid their legal obligations by (the often disingenuous)
assertion of compliance with the agency's "voluntary repatriation" standard
as an alternative to satisfaction of the Convention's cessation criteria. More
fundamentally, these risks have been substantially increased by UNHCR
actions, which actively promote deference to the UNHCR repatriation
practices shown above, and therefore give rise to the risk of premature
mandated repatriation. In addition, UNHCR has more recently sought to
persuade governments to take their cue on the application of the test for
cessation of refugee status from the agency itself, thereby compounding the
risk that states will simply defer to UNHCR practice rather than
conscientiously applying the legal standards that in fact bind them.
In practice, it is not surprising that the existence of a large-scale,
UNHCR-authorized repatriation is commonly understood to suggest the
[V]oluntary repatriation can take place at a lower threshold of change in the
country of origin, occurring as it does at the express wish of the refugee, who may
also have personal reasons for repatriating, regardless of the situation prevailing in
the country of origin. Therefore, the facilitation or promotion of voluntary
repatriation by UNHCR does not necessarily mean that the cessation clause should
be applied. However, where large-scale voluntary repatriation is organized against a
backdrop of fundamental changes and providing that such fundamental changes
stabilize and can eventually be considered as durable, the cessation clause may be
invoked at an appropriate later time.
Id.
84 For example, in its discussion of repatriation consequent to the application of
Article 1C(5)-(6), UNHCR notes that the "Convention does not address the question of
voluntary repatriation of refugees directly." UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook,
supra note 18, at 8-10 (emphasis added). Not only is there no explicit recognition of the
right of states to enforce mandated repatriation when the criteria of Article 1C(5)-(6) are
met, but the Handbook obfuscates the question by making the (technically accurate)
general assertion that, 'The principle of voluntariness is the cornerstone of international
protection with respect to the return of refugees," without simultaneously acknowledging
its non-applicability to persons who have ceased to be refugees. Id. at 10. Despite a recent
and more candid approach to the issue of cessation itself, no comparable frankness on the
consequential right of mandated repatriation has been forthcoming. See UNHCR, Ceased
Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 7.
[Vol. 20:1 20051
RIGHT OF STATES
propriety of repatriation as a general policy, equally open to states parties. 85
But there is evidence that UNHCR may do little to challenge that perception,
and may at times even rely upon it.86 Particularly when the language of
enthusiasm for return is embraced by UNHCR-for example, its decision in
early 2003 to "change its policy from merely facilitating to actively
promoting repatriation to Rwanda... [under a plan] harmonised [sic] and
implemented across Africa"87 -a signal is sent to governments that
repatriation is really the appropriate course of action for states themselves to
pursue.
At times, UNHCR has moved beyond failure to challenge prevailing
assumptions about the salience of its repatriation role, and has instead
actively advanced positions which suggest that national practice on
repatriation should be guided by relevant UNHCR institutional decisions-
even though, as described above, the UNHCR decision to promote
repatriation is often made at a time when cessation due to a fundamental
change of circumstances would be premature. 88 Indeed, deference to
UNHCR positions on when to pursue repatriation is said by the agency to be
part of the "responsibilities of the host country. '89 Against the backdrop of
such pronouncements, the risk of premature repatriation without due regard
to the Convention's cessation criteria is intensified. For example, Zambia
raised concerns about the risks of landmines for Angolan refugees slated for
85 The point is not that UNHCR intends to provide comfort to states anxious to
avoid the strictures of Article 1C(5)-(6); to the contrary, as discussed below, its formal
positions adumbrate strict requirements for cessation. But, because these requirements are
not linked to the right of states to effect mandated repatriation, the opportunity for
confusion and obfuscation arises.
86 For example, the Zambian Home Affairs Permanent Secretary was quoted as
having said that his country was "not in a hurry to repatriate the more than 5,000
Rwandan refugees currently in the country until the United Nations signs a cessation
clause to strip them of their status .... He said the repatriation procedures and
endorsement were done by the international community and the host nation only gave a
helping hand to the UNHCR." Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees Voluntary, TIMES OF
ZAMBIA, Mar. 3, 2003.
87 5,000 Refugees to be Repatriated from Zambia, IRIN, Jan. 20, 2003 (quoting
UNHCR's Regional Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, Wairimu Karago)
(emphasis added). This policy shift was apparently justified on the basis of a belief that
the Rwandan justice system was positioned to deal with genocide allegations more
quickly and fairly. Id.
88 See supra text accompanying note 69.
89 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18. Specifically, UNHCR
asserts that "The country of asylum should respect the leading role of UNHCR in
promoting, facilitating[,] and coordinating voluntary repatriation." Id. at 12, sec. 2.5.
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repatriation by UNHCR, but was reportedly lobbied by UNHCR to acquiesce
in the return. The agency sought to reassure Zambia that even though many
areas were "heavily mined... '[w]ith the funding UNHCR has received, we
will be expanding our presence in those areas of resettlement to ensure that
people are reminded of the threat of landmines. So the problem is being
addressed."'90
The blurring of the line between the circumstances under which UNHCR
may legitimately promote the genuinely voluntary return of refugees and the
conditions which justify the withdrawal of protection by a state party is most
acute when UNHCR opts not simply to encourage the repatriation of a
refugee population, but instead issues what it refers to as a "formal
declaration of general cessation." 91 The legal relevance of such declarations
is understandably ambiguous to states and others. Subject to the views of the
Economic and Social Council, UNHCR may elect to apply a somewhat
different version of the changed circumstances cessation clause92 to refugees
in receipt of its institutional protection or assistance. On the other hand,
states-and only states-are entrusted with the responsibility to apply
conscientiously the Convention's cessation clause to refugees in receipt of
their protection.93
Despite this clear delineation of responsibilities, the agency has recently
90 Angola-Zambia: UNHCR Addresses Returnee Concerns of Landmines and
Hunger, supra note 78 (emphasis added).
91 UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, at n.3. Historical
examples include: Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to Refugees from Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Nov. 15, 1991; Applicability of Cessation Clauses to
Refugees from Chile, Mar. 18, 1994; Applicability of the Cessation Clauses to Refugees
from the Republics of Malawi and Mozambique, Dec. 31, 1996; Applicability of the
Cessation Clauses to Refugees from Bulgaria and Romania, Oct. 1, 1997; Applicability
of the Ceased Circumstances, Cessation Clauses to pre-1991 refugees from Ethiopia,
Sept. 23, 1999; and Declaration of Cessation Timor Leste, Dec. 20, 2002. Id.
92 The change of circumstances cessation clause which governs the work of
UNHCR does not simply limit cessation to persons in fact able to avail themselves of the
protection of their country of origin, but instead directs attention to whether persons have
no more than grounds "of personal convenience," including "[r]easons of a purely
economic character," for refusing to avail themselves of the home country's protection.
UNHCR, Statute, supra note 17, at art. 6(A)(ii)(e).
93 In the same year in which they debated the issue of legal standards for
repatriation, the states that make up UNHCR's Executive Committee affirmed that,
"refugee protection is primarily the responsibility of States, and... UNHCR's mandated
role in this regard cannot substitute for effective action, political will, and full
cooperation on the part of States .... UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No.
81, supra note 16, at (d).4
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taken the view that its own institutional positions on competence are to be
treated by states as directly relevant to cessation under the Convention:
The Executive Committee Conclusion 69 affirms that any declarations by
UNHCR that its competence ceases to apply in relation to certain refugees
may be useful to States in connection with the application of the cessation
clauses. Where UNHCR has made a declaration of cessation of its
competence in relation to any specified group of refugees, States may resort
to the cessation clauses for a similar group of refugees if they deem it
appropriate and useful for resolving the situation of these refugees in their
territory.94
This ambition to determine effectively the issue of cessation for states
parties is most clearly seen in the way in which UNHCR speaks about
changes to the application of its institutional mandate. For example, the High
Commissioner for Refugees is reported to have stated during a visit to Africa
that "Rwanda is safe for refugees in Tanzania and Uganda .... 'In Tanzania,
we informed the refugees that they could return to Rwanda. Some have
returned but many remain,' he said .... Such people, he said, were 'not
refugees anymore."'95 A similar elision of institutional and Convention-
based determinations can be seen even in UNHCR's more formal statements.
For example, a press release of May 8, 2002, entitled, "UNHCR Declares
Cessation of Refugee Status for Eritreans," stated:
UNHCR announced ... that it is ending refugee status for all Eritreans who
fled their country as a result of the war of independence or the recent border
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The world-wide cessation will take
effect on December 31 and will affect hundreds of thousands of Eritreans in
neighbouring countries. 96
Only near the end of the statement is the true scope of the declaration made
clear, though still in language which suggests the logic of its more general
applicability, and followed immediately by a reference to the process of
94 UNHCR, Cessation Note, supra note 11, 33. The same document candidly
recognized, however, that "[t]he decision to apply the 'ceased circumstances' cessation
clause lies with the State of asylum concerned." Id. 1 36. Its most recent statements on
the issue, however, fails even to note that cessation decisions are, in fact, the duty of
states parties to adjudicate. UNHCR, Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14.
95 Rwanda-Tanzania-Uganda: Rwanda is Safe for Returning Refugees, Says
UNHCR Head, IRIN, Apr. 16, 2003 (emphasis added).
96 Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR
Declares Cessation of Refugee Status for Eritreans (May 8, 2002).
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cessation under the Refugee Convention:
"I believe that these two groups of refugees from Eritrea should no longer
have a fear of persecution or other reasons to continue to be regarded as
refugees," said Ruud Lubbers, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
"They will, therefore, cease to be regarded as refugees by my Office with
effect from the end of this year." 97
As these positions make clear, whatever risk of confusion regarding
standards for repatriation exists by virtue of UNHCR's de facto dominance
of repatriation efforts in the less developed world and the manipulation of
those standards by some poorly intentioned host states is intensified when the
agency seeks to issue signals on the appropriate timing of repatriation, and
especially when it seeks to equate its institutional positions on cessation of
refugee status with the determinations that are in fact to be made by states
parties.98 It is bad enough that UNHCR has not made it clear when, and
under what circumstances, mandated repatriation of former refugees is lawful
under the Convention. But, it becomes increasingly difficult to criticize states
for premature repatriation efforts when they are instructed to rely on agency
determinations (intended to lead to the promotion by UNHCR of "voluntary
repatriation") as the foundation for their own decisions regarding when to
terminate status and commence what may lawfully be-and often are in
fact-involuntary repatriations. The elision of standards and mandates has
97 Id. The immediate next paragraph reads,
Both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention, which is applied
in Africa, stipulate that the conventions shall cease to apply to any refugee... "if he
can no longer, because of the circumstances in connection with which he was
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to avail himself of the
protection of the country of his nationality."
Id.
98 There is no legal basis for states parties simply to defer to UNHCR's institutional
views on who remains entitled to refugee protection as an alternative to domestic
adjudication of the issue. UNHCR decisions to delete particular groups from its
institutional competence are not strictly grounded in application of the criteria in Article
1C(5)-(6) of the Convention, and may be compelled by the same political, economic and
other concerns which often lead the agency to promote repatriation before safety is fully
established. In any event, cessation under the terms of the Refugee Convention cannot
lawfully occur on the basis of the sort of blanket pronouncements that UNHCR makes
regarding the scope of its mandate-it must rather take account of particularized risk, and
individuated circumstances. It is states parties which are held to account under the
Refugee Convention, and their accountability is strictly a function of compliance with
their formal treaty obligations.
202
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
simply created a conceptual morass.
While the conceptual confusion can clearly lead to unwarranted denials
of protection, the effort to equate UNHCR views regarding cessation of
refugee status with the standards applicable to states may also result in
continued protection for persons no longer entitled to refugee status under the
Convention. One of the ways in which the cessation criteria that govern the
work of UNHCR as an agency differs from that which applies to the actions
of states parties to the Refugee Convention is that UNHCR enjoys a broader
authority to retain under its competence persons who no longer face the risk
of being persecuted, so long as their reasons for refusing to accept the
renewed protection of their own country are not simply rooted in economic
or other considerations of personal convenience. 99
Under the Refugee Convention, in contrast, cessation of status is to
follow once the changed circumstances test is met. 100 By virtue of an explicit
compromise between the majority of drafters, who favored a purely objective
test of risk for refugee status, and the minority, who wished to allow refugees
to retain their status based upon purely emotional or psychological
reasons, 10 1 pre-1951 refugees were granted the right to invoke a proviso
regarding "compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution" to retain
their refugee status even after a relevant change of circumstances. 10 2 But for
the future, refugee status was reserved for those able to show a continuing
objective risk of being persecuted. Because refugee status requires the ability
99 UNHCR, Statute, supra note 17, at art. 6(e).
The competence of the High Commissioner shall cease to apply to any
person.., if ... [h]e can no longer, because of the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist[,] ... claim grounds
other than personal convenience for continuing to refuse to avail himself of the
protection of the country of nationality. Reasons of a purely economic nature may
not be invoked.
Id. (emphasis added).
100 Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1(C)(5).
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person.., if... [hie can no
longer, because of the circumstances in connection with which he has been
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of
the protection of the country of his nationality ......
Id.
101 See REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 4, at 66-69.
102 "Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under Section
A(1) of this Article and who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality."
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at art. I(C)(5) (emphasis added).
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to show "a present fear of persecution,"'10 3 refugees must be able to show that
they "are or may in the future be deprived of the protection of their country
of origin."'104
Despite the clarity of the text of the Refugee Convention on this point,
UNHCR has regrettably invoked an unwieldy claim of customary
international law to assert not only the duty of states to apply the "compelling
reasons" proviso to modem refugees, 105 but also to suggest a responsibility
(in principle, if not in law) to read the Convention as the effective equivalent
of its own statute. 10 6 While all states have the sovereign authority to allow
any person they wish to remain on their territory and while it will often be
humane and right to extend such generosity, 10 7 this is not a matter fairly
103 Statement of Sir Leslie Brass of the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.18, at 6 (Feb. 8, 1950).
104 Statement of Mr. Rochefort of France, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/529, at 4 (Nov. 2, 1949).
105 "Application of the 'compelling reasons' exception is interpreted to extend
beyond the actual words of the provision to apply to Article 1 A(2) refugees. This reflects
a general humanitarian principle that is now well-grounded in State practice." UNHCR,
Ceased Circumstances Guidelines, supra note 14, 21. Yet, in the same document,
UNHCR concedes that there is, in fact, a paucity of relevant state practice upon which to
draw. "Due to the fact that large numbers of refugees voluntarily repatriate without an
official declaration that conditions in their countries of origin no longer justify
international protection, declarations [of cessation due to changed conditions] are
infrequent." Id. [ 3. It is therefore questionable whether there is truly a sound basis to
assert a clear norm of customary international law, which effectively supercedes the text
of the Refugee Convention.
106 Id. 1 22.
In addition [to exemption based upon the effects of past persecution], the
Executive Committee, in Conclusion No. 69, recommends that States consider
"appropriate arrangements" for persons "who cannot be expected to leave the
country of asylum, due to a long stay in that country resulting in strong family,
social and economic links." In such situations, countries of asylum are encouraged
to provide, and often do provide, the individuals concerned with an alternative
residence status, which retains previously acquired rights, though in some instances
with refugee status being withdrawn. Adopting this approach for long-settled
refugees is not required by the 1951 Convention per se, but it is consistent with the
instrument's broad humanitarian purpose and with respect for previously acquired
rights ....
Id.
107 The rationale for the extension of the proviso in U.S. law to all refugees has been
stated as "an expression of humanitarian considerations that sometimes past persecution
is so horrific that the march of time and the ebb and flow of political tides cannot efface
the fear in the mind of the persecuted." Jaswant Lal v. INS, No. 98-71087, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22693, at *29-30 (9th Cir. July 3, 2001).
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understood to be required by either the text or purposes of refugee law.108
This point was recently affirmed in a detailed decision of the English Court
of Appeal:
Aspirations are to be distinguished from legal obligations. It is significant
that a number of the [arguments] relied on by the appellants are expressed
in terms of what "could" or "should" be done .... This is not the language
which one would expect if there was a widespread and general practice
establishing a legal obligation ....
Where one has clear and express language imposing a restriction upon the
scope of a particular provision, as is the case with the proviso to Article
IC(5), it must require very convincing evidence of a widespread and
general practice of the international community to establish that that
restriction is no longer to be applied as a matter of international law... A
number of states do adopt a more generous approach towards Article IC(5)
than is required by the terms of the Convention itself, but they
represent.., a minority of the signatories ....
Moreover, it must be seen as significant that the international community
did not take the opportunity at the time of the 1967 Protocol to amend the
proviso to Article 1C(5) when it was considering the temporal scope of the
108 UNHCR has at times recognized as much:
The underlying rationale for the cessation clauses was expressed to the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in the drafting of the 1951 Convention by the first
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, who
stated that refugee status should "not be granted for a day longer than was absolutely
necessary, and should come to an end ... if, in accordance with the terms of the
Convention or the Statute, a person had the status of de facto citizenship, that is to
say, if he really had the rights and obligations of a citizen of a given country."
Cessation of refugee status therefore applies when the refugee, having secured or
being able to secure national protection, either of the country of origin or of another
country, no longer needs international protection.
UNHCR, Cessation Note, supra note 11, 4. Indeed, a footnote to the same document
recognizes the hortatory nature of the advice to extend the proviso clause beyond its
textual ambit.
The proviso expressly covers only those refugees falling under section A(1) of
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, that is, those persons who are considered as
refugees under the "Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14
September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization."
However, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status suggests that the exception reflects a more general humanitarian
principle and could also be applied to refugees other than those in Article 1A(1) of
the 1951 Convention (see paragraph 136 of the Handbook).
Id. at n.8.
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1951 Convention ....
One might think it desirable that states should ... recognise [sic] the
humanitarian purpose which would be served by ignoring the restriction on
the proviso to Article IC(5). But that is not enough to establish a legal
obligation binding upon all parties to the Convention .... 109
This analysis is clearly compelling as a matter of law. But because
UNHCR has been unwilling to distinguish clearly between its own
institutional cessation and repatriation authority and that of states parties to
the Convention, the authentic scope of the Refugee Convention was
unnecessarily and unhelpfully muddied.
V. CONSTRAINTS ON THE PROCESS OF LAWFUL REPATRIATION
The risks of conflating the principles that govern UNHCR's decisions
regarding the termination of protected status and amenability to voluntary
repatriation with the cessation requirements of refugee law binding on states,
which may lead to mandated repatriation, apply also to the question of limits
on the authority of states to require repatriation of persons whose refugee
status has ceased. Of relevance not only to governments in the less developed
world, but also to industrialized countries increasingly prone to order
mandated repatriation, there is real ambiguity in UNHCR's positions
regarding the standards which govern the actual process by which lawful
repatriation may be effected.
Because this is not a subject expressly addressed by the Convention, the
agency has devised a series of policies for the guidance of states. In an early
formulation, UNHCR's Executive Committee opined that repatriation must
"be carried out under conditions of absolute safety....,"1 0 The requirement
for "absolute" safety has not, however, featured in more recent agency
standards, which have instead posited the bifurcated duty to carry out
repatriation "in safety, and [with] dignity."' I
The first part of this notion-safety-is said specifically to require that
repatriation be conducted so as to avoid "harassment, arbitrary detention or
physical threats during or after return." 112 More recently, UNHCR has noted
109 R. (Hoxha) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ
1403 (Eng. C.A.), at paras. 46-48.
110 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40, supra note 70, at (b).
I 1 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 65, supra note 31, at (j) (1991).
This standard is now embraced by the agency. UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation
Handbook, supra note 18, at 11.
112 UNHCR, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 65, supra note 110, at (j).
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as well that safety requires analysis of "physical security [during the process
of return] ... including protection from armed attacks, and mine-free
routes .... 113 The second branch of the UNHCR standard, requiring that
return be "with dignity," is frankly acknowledged by the agency to be "less
self-evident than that of safety." 1 4 UNHCR defines "return with dignity" to
require that "refugees are not manhandled; that they can return
unconditionally... ; that they are not arbitrarily separated from family
members; and that they are treated with respect and full acceptance by their
national authorities, including the full restoration of their rights."
'
"
15
The fungibility of the "in safety and with dignity" standard-particularly
the fact that this language is not directly rooted in any clear legal obligations
of states-is likely to engender confusion. 16 Because the language stands
apart from binding norms of human rights law, the "in safety and with
dignity" standard can inadvertently send the signal that UNHCR is merely
recommending best practice to governments. To ensure that they are taken
seriously, protection concerns would be better served by an explicit linkage
to binding legal standards. While these may not encompass every constraint
seen as desirable by UNHCR or others, all core concerns are encompassed in
a way that clearly commands the respect of governments.
Specifically, the duty to effect repatriation in safety can be said to be a
matter of legal obligation, particularly in view of the requirements of Articles
7(1) and 9(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant.1 17 These binding standards
113 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 11. The same
standard regrettably refers also to considerations actually relevant to the determination of
cessation itself, not to the safety of repatriation ("legal safety such as amnesties or public
assurances of personal freedom, integrity, non-discrimination and freedom from fear of
persecution or punishment upon return... [and of] if not mine-free then at least
demarcated settlement sites .... "). Id. It similarly places consideration of material safety
("access to land or means of livelihood") under the safety rubric, matters which ought
instead to be addressed in the context of the requirement of dignified return.
114 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 11.
115 Id.
116 Even those who advocate reference to the "safety" standard impliedly concede
its fungibility. See, e.g., GUY GOODwIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 276
(2d ed. 1996).
So far as safe return may have a role to play in the construction of policy, its
minimum conditions include a transparent process based on credible
information .... These or equivalent means seem likely to ensure that the element
of risk is properly appreciated, so reducing the chance of States acting in breach of
their protection obligations.
Id. (emphasis original).
117 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1(1992),
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require respectively that states not engage in "torture, or... cruel,
inhuman[,] or degrading treatment or punishment" 1 8 and that they
affirmatively ensure "security of person."' 19 Under the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee, a state party is liable for the actions of its
agents-logically including those involved in the process of repatriation-
even if those actions occur outside the state's own borders. 120 The rights to
at 29. The European Union has affirmed the centrality of human rights norms to defining
the right of repatriation. Its Council Directive on Temporary Protection provides that
protection should be ended only when "the situation in the country of origin is such as to
permit safe and durable return... with due respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms...." European Union Council Directive, art. (6)(2), 2001 O.J. 15 (212)
(describing minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of Efforts between
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof)
[hereinafter EU Temporary Protection Directive].
118 Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 2, at art. 7.
119 Id. at art. 9(1).
120 Under Article 2(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant, obligations inhere in "all
individuals within [a state's] territory and subject to its jurisdiction .... " Civil and
Political Covenant, supra note 2. Rather than adopting a literal construction of this
standard, the Human Rights Committee has embraced an interpretation which respects
the objects and purposes of the Covenant.
Article 2(1) of the Covenant... does not imply that the State party concerned
cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its
agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of
the Government of that State or in opposition to it.. .. [I]t would be unconscionable
to... interpret the responsibility under [A]rticle 2 of the Covenant as to permit a
State part to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State,
which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.
Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40, Supp. No. 40, at 176, para. 12.3 (1981); Casriego v. Uruguay, Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. R.13/56, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, Supp. No. 40, at 185, para.
10.3 (1981). In a separate opinion, Committee member Tomuschat offered a helpful
explanation of why this result was compelled despite the possibility of a literal
construction to the contrary.
To construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict literal
meaning as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond the national
boundaries would.., lead to utterly absurd results. The formula was intended to
take care of objective difficulties which might impede the implementation of the
Covenant in specific situations. Thus, a State party is normally unable to ensure the
effective enjoyment of the rights under the Covenant to its citizens abroad, having at
its disposal only the tools of diplomatic protection with their limited potential.
Instances of occupation of foreign territory offer another example of situations
which the drafters of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligations
of State parties to their own territory. All of these factual patterns have in common,
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
be protected from torture and cruel or inhuman treatment, and to benefit from
security of person moreover inhere equally in citizens and aliens. 121
An action may be defined as "cruel or inhuman" if it meets most, but not
all, of the criteria for torture. For example, the specific intent requirement
may not be met, or the level of pain may not rise to the same level of
severity. But actions which are neither cruel nor inhuman are also prohibited
if they are "degrading," meaning that they are intended to humiliate the
victim, or show an egregious disregard for his or her humanity. More
generally, the duty to ensure "security of person" means that states are
required to take measures to protect persons being repatriated by them from
foreseeable attacks against their personal integrity, and perhaps also their
property. By way of example, the treatment afforded a long-term Rwandan
resident of Tanzania by authorities enforcing a bilateral repatriation
agreement likely amounted to both degrading treatment, and to a failure to
ensure his security of person: "I was grazing livestock; they came and beat
me up. In the confusion, I was taken one way and the livestock in another.
They took the money I had in my pocket, and told me, 'Rwandan go
home.'"1 22
The "in dignity" prong of the UNHCR repatriation standard is
particularly unwieldy. Two of the concerns said to define whether
repatriation can be conducted in dignity-the existence of an unconditional
right to return and acceptance of the returnee by authorities with restoration
of rights-are more appropriately canvassed in the context of the protection
prong of the cessation inquiry itself. Nor is there any need to rely on the "in
dignity" concept to proscribe the risk of "manhandling," since such concerns
however, that they provide plausible grounds for denying the protection of the
Covenant. It may be concluded, therefore, that it was the intention of the drafters,
whose sovereign decisions cannot be challenged, to restrict the territorial scope of
the Covenant in view of such situations where enforcing the Covenant would be
likely to encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it envisaged, however, to grant
States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate
attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad.
Burgos v. Uruguay, supra, at App.
121 "Aliens... must not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment .... Aliens have full right to... security of person." Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, The Position of Aliens Under the
Covenant, at para. 7 (1986).
122 Mary Kimani, Forced To Go Home: Rwandan Immigrants in Tanzania,
INTERNEws, Apr. 15, 2003. The same report noted that, "The President of the National
Repatriation Commission, Sheik Abdul Karim Harerimana [said] ... that the move by the
Tanzanian government caught more than the evictees by surprise. 'We had not
anticipated this."' Id.
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are encompassed by the duty to ensure a safe return grounded in Articles 7(1)
and 9(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant. And while UNHCR is clearly
right to argue that repatriation would be undignified if it led to the arbitrary
separation of family members, the real constraints on state actions would be
made more clear if grounded in specific human rights obligations. 123 The
Human Rights Committee has expressly observed that the right to freedom
from arbitrary or unlawful interference with family life inheres despite the
(former) refugee's status as a non-citizen:
The Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] does not recognize the right of
aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party .... However, in
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant in
relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-
discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life
arise .... [Non-citizens] may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence. 124
Indeed, there is a firm basis to assert a customary legal duty on states to
avoid acts which arbitrarily interfere with family unity, at least where family
is defined to include only an opposite-sex spouse and minor, dependant
children.
. By focusing on the human right to be free from unlawful or arbitrary
interference with family unity, the legally binding nature of state obligations
is made more clear. Lawful repatriation consequent to cessation of refugee
status is, of course, not sensibly deemed either arbitrary or unlawful per se.
The relevant question is thus whether the way in which repatriation is
123 Reference should be made in particular to Article 17 of the Civil and Political
Covenant, supra note 2, and to Articles 10(1), 23, and 24 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 2;
G.A. Res. 2200A, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
GAOR, 21stSess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Economic and Social Covenant].
124 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, supra note 121, at paras.
5, 7 (emphasis added). See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 17, On
the Rights of the Child (Article 24), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, at
174, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
The Covenant requires that children should be protected against discrimination
on any grounds .... Reports by States parties should indicate how legislation and
practice ensure that measures of protection are aimed at removing all discrimination
in every field ... particularly as between children who are nationals and children
who are aliens ....
Id.
210
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
effected renders an otherwise permissible act either arbitrary or unlawful. It
will ordinarily be possible to respect family unity even while pursuing
repatriation, for example by ensuring that the family as a whole is safely
returned to the home country. On the other hand, at least where the laws of
the host state grant citizenship to all children born on its territory, it may be
necessary to delay repatriation of the family unit until any citizen children
reach the age of majority, since earlier removal would deny them the right to
live in their own country. 125 Indeed, an important decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada invoked international law to require that account be taken of
the rights of Canadian-born children before ordering the deportation of their
non-Canadian mother.126
A final concern with the free-standing "in safety, and with dignity"
standard is that it likely overstates the real obligations of governments
effecting mandated repatriation. 127 As the preceding discussion makes clear,
125 Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, states
"undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality... [and to ensure that no] child is illegally deprived of some or all of the
elements of his or her identity." G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
art. 8, U.N.Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). Governments agree to
"ensure that a child is not separated from his or her parents against their will, except
when.., such deprivation is necessary for the best interests of the child." Id. at art. 9.
Moreover, "applications by a child or his or her parents to enter ... a State Party for the
purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by State Parties in a positive, humane
and expeditious manner." Id. at art. 10. And under no circumstances may any of the
rights guaranteed in the convention be withheld on a discriminatory basis, including on
the basis of "the child's or his or her parent's legal or legal guardian's... national,
ethnic[,] or social origin.., or other status." Id. at art. 2.
126 Baker v. Canada, [1999] S.C.R. 817.
The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), in its
preamble, states that the child "needs special safeguards and care." The principles of
the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] and other international instruments place
special importance on protections for children and childhood, and on particular
consideration of their interests, needs, and rights. They help show the values that are
central in determining whether this decision was ... reasonable.
Id.
127 The difficulty stems in part from the tendency previously discussed to conflate
the rules that govern UNHCR's work as an agency with those that circumscribe the
repatriation authority of states parties to the Refugee Convention. The elaboration of the
meaning of repatriation in safety and with dignity is textually said to define the ways in
which UNHCR will conduct its repatriation work. But the language of safety and dignity
is included in resolutions of the Executive Committee addressed to the authority of states,
and UNHCR follows the recitation of its institutional positions with the assertion that it is
part of the "responsibilities of the host country" to "respect the leading role of UNHCR in
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international human rights law precludes the right to effect an otherwise
lawful repatriation only in circumstances of fairly acute risk.128 Thus, for
example, there is reason to question the legal authority for UNHCR's view
that repatriation cannot lawfully be undertaken until the (former) refugee will
have access in the destination to material security (access to land or means of
livelihood). 129 To the contrary, international human rights law guarantees
only a basic right to access the necessities of life, 130 not a full-blown right to
have either property' 3 ' or a job. Even the expert charged by the U.N. with
promoting, facilitating and coordinating voluntary repatriation." UNHCR, Voluntary
Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 8-10.
128 The most extensive right to non-return apart from the duty which follows from
Convention refugee status is that based on application of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The House of Lords has recently taken the
view that, at an extreme level, the risk of infringement of even rights other than Article 3
of the European Convention (the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment) may give rise to a duty of non-return. R. (on the application of Ullah) v.
Special Adjudicator, [2002] EWCA Civ 1856 (Eng. C.A.), at para. 47; Do v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 26. Nonetheless, all of the members of the
House of Lords speaking to this issue were clear that, as a general principle, the
evidentiary standard for an article other than Article 3 to give rise to a duty of non-return
is relatively high. For Lord Bingham, "successful reliance [on articles other than Article
3] demands presentation of a very strong case." (Special Adjudicator, [2002] EWCA Civ
1856, at para. 24. Lord Steyn held that, "It will be necessary to establish at least a real
risk of a flagrant violation of the very essence of the right before other articles could
become engaged." Id. at para. 50. Similarly, Lord Carswell insisted on the "flagrancy
principle," which he attempted to define:
The concept of a flagrant breach or violation may not always be easy for
domestic courts to apply... [T]he right in question would [need to] be completely
denied or nullified in the destination country. This would harmonize with the
concept of a fundamental breach, with which courts in this jurisdiction are familiar.
Id. at para. 69.
In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the only right thus far
clearly posited as the basis for an implied right of non-return is Article 8's protection of
private life. See Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 50, 1179
(2001), approved by R. (on the application of Razgar) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2003] EWCA Civ 840 (Eng. C.A.). But the European Court of Human
Rights has not suggested that, as a general matter, risk of violation of any right set by the
European Convention in the applicant's state of origin is sufficient to give rise to a duty
of non-return.
129 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation Handbook, supra note 18, at 11.
130 This may be derived from Articles 6, 7, 9, and 10 of the Civil and Political
Covenant, as well as from Article 11 of the Economic and Social Covenant. Civil and
Political Covenant, supra note 2; Economic and Social Covenant, supra note 123.
131 Perhaps the strongest affirmation of a right to property, and specifically of a right
212
[Vol. 20:1 2005]
RIGHT OF STATES
studying the issue of the property rights of returning refugees has focused his
work on housing rights, noting that these rights "are enshrined in
international human rights and humanitarian law to a far greater degree and
encompass far more under international law, substantively speaking,
than... property rights more generally."' 132 Second and more critically, the
position that repatriation can be ordered only if it results in return to
conditions of material security, unhelpfully confuses the standards which
should govern the way in which repatriation is conducted with considerations
of the qualitative standards that must prevail in the place of destination. The
latter questions are part of the cessation inquiry itself, not of the definition of
permissible means of repatriation.' 33
By way of helpful contrast, the European Union's recent Directive on
Temporary Protection 134 moves more closely towards the codification of a
legally oriented set of constraints on the effectuation of repatriation. The
of returning refugees to receive restitution for property of which they were deprived, is
based on the provisions of the International Covenant of the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. G.A. Res. 2106, International Covenant of the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). Under Article 5(d)(v),
States parties agree to eliminate racial discrimination (i.e., discrimination based on race,
color, national, or ethnic origin) in regard to "[t]he right to own property with others." Id.
at art. 5(d)(v). On the basis of this provision, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has "emphasize[d] that... refugees... have, after their return to their
homes of origin, the right to be restored to them property of which they were deprived in
the course of the conflict and to be compensated appropriately for any such property that
cannot be restored to hem. Any commitments or statements relating to such property
made under duress are null and void." Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 18, para. (C)2(c), U.N. Doc.
A/51/18 (1996). Article 5 (in contrast to, for example, the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) does expressly recognize property rights as a form of civil right. But it must be
recalled that the purpose of this part of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination is clearly to proscribe race-based discrimination. It is legally doubtful that
the duty not to discriminate in regard to property rights on grounds of race can be said to
give rise to affirmative obligation to recognize property rights in the first place.
132 Housing and Property Restitution in the Context of the Return of Refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons: Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur Paulo
Sgrgio Pinheiro, Submitted in Accordance with Sub-Commission Resolution 2002/7, U.N.
ESCOR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Sess.,
para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/1 1 (2003).
133 It is likely that at least some core aspects of material security are relevant to
whether or not protection is available in the refugee's state of origin-the third prong of
UNHCR's recommended approach to assessment of Article 1C(5)-(6).
134 EU Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 117.
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Directive acknowledges that the repatriation of those no longer entitled to
protection must be conducted with due "respect for human dignity."' 135 But it
implements that principle by way of two quite specific injunctions.
First, the Directive denies member states the right to expel persons no
longer in need of protection if they "cannot, in view of their state of health,
reasonably be expected to travel; where for example they would suffer
serious negative effects if their treatment was interrupted."' 136 A delay in
repatriation is also sanctioned (though, regrettably, not required) so as to
"allow families whose children are minors and attend school in a Member
State... to complete the current school period."' 37 The specificity of each of
these constraints can readily be linked to a duty to conduct repatriation with
due regard for human rights obligations-in the one case, the right to basic
health care, 138 and in the other, the right of children to access primary
education. 139 These constraints moreover do not confuse the question of
whether repatriation is warranted at all with the distinct set of issues
regarding whether repatriation may be lawfully carried out at a particular
moment, and if so, what precautions are required given the circumstances of
the individual concerned. 140 They are instead appropriately directed simply
to averting the adverse effects of repatriation on the human rights (to access
basic health care, and to benefit from primary education) of those to be
repatriated by setting relevant constraints on the timing or means by which
otherwise lawful repatriation may be effected.
135 Id. at art. 22(1).
136 ld. at art. 23(1).
137 Id. at art. 23(2).
138 This right is guaranteed by Article 12 of the Economic and Social Covenant,
supra note 123.
139 Id. at art. 13(2)(a).
140 While not required by law, it is both more practical and respectful of refugee
autonomy to encourage former refugees to return home of their own initiative wherever
possible. To this end, the extension to them of a generous deadline for departure, together
with a readjustment allowance for voluntary compliance, may be of value. See Manuel
Angel Castillo & James C. Hathaway, Temporary Protection, in RECONCEIVING
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 21 (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997). It is unlikely,
however, that such a program will be successful when refugees are not convinced of the
safety of return. For example, a British initiative for failed asylum seekers from
Afghanistan in early 2003-under which individuals where offered £600 and families
£2,500 to go back to a "safe area" inside Afghanistan-is reported to have attracted only
39 applicants, far short of the target of 1,000. Nigel Martin, Protests at First Enforced
Return of Afghans Since War, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 29, 2003, at 6.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the duty of states simply to protect refugees for the duration of
the risk of being persecuted in their home state, it is both explicable and
lawful that host governments will seek to bring refugee status to an end when
the conflict or other cause of flight abates. As a matter of principle, this
possibility should be embraced as an opportunity both to renew asylum
capacity and to restore former refugees to their communities of origin. The
challenge for those of us committed to refugee protection is not to oppose
such returns, but rather clearly to define the criteria for the lawful termination
of refugee status, for the commencement of repatriation, and for the conduct
of the repatriation exercise itself.
To date, clarity has proved illusive in large measure because of serious
confusion between the standards which govern the work of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-as an international agency-and
those which circumscribe the sovereign authority of states parties to the
Refugee Convention. Because of the agency's silence on the Convention-
derived authority of states to require the repatriation of persons who have
ceased to be refugees, governments have too often taken UNHCR voluntary
repatriation initiatives as a signal that they may commence their own less-
than-voluntary repatriations without due regard for the cessation criteria,
which in fact bind them. In the face of such disingenuous state action,
UNHCR has not dependably insisted upon respect for the more stringent
cessation criteria which govern access to mandated repatriation.
More fundamentally, though, UNHCR currently seems determined to
pursue policies which put it at the center of decisionmaking on the
termination by states of their refugee protection efforts for particular groups,
even at the cost of developing a solid understanding of Convention-based
rights and obligations. There are now policies which suggest that states have
a duty to follow UNHCR' s lead on the timing of repatriation-which policies
regrettably do not clearly indicate that UNHCR voluntary repatriation
programs may well be legally pursued long before states would be entitled to
invoke the Convention's cessation criteria to justify mandated repatriation.
Indeed, UNHCR has gone farther still, actively promoting its own role in
determining when and if the cessation of refugee status is justified. This
approach fails to take into account the differences between cessation under
UNHCR's mandate and under the Refugee Convention itself, and also
unhelpfully reinforces the impression that state parties need only follow the
UNHCR's lead in determining when the withdrawal of protection is
warranted, rather than conscientiously applying their minds to the
circumstances of refugees measured in relation to their Convention duties.
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As a result, the real obligations of states relevant to repatriation have
been sidelined. Not only is there the potential for protection risks of the kind
described above, but also for the loss of a more flexible understanding of
refugee status that is reconcilable to the legitimate concerns of states required
to host large numbers of refugees in flight from conflict and other forms of
broadly-based harm. For these reasons, it is high time for formal recognition
of the fact that the Refugee Convention grants governments the right to bring
refugee status to an end and to commence mandated repatriation if and when
there is a fundamental change of circumstances in the home country.
Suggestions that governments should instead be concerned about whether
repatriation is voluntary, or whether it can be achieved "in safety and with
dignity" should be abandoned as legally misplaced.
The authentic test for access to mandated repatriation is whether the
change in the country of origin is truly fundamental, in the sense that the
cause of flight or presence abroad has been eradicated, the change has been
shown to be enduring, and it has been shown to have practical consequences,
in the sense that the former refugee will be restored to the protection of the
country of origin. When these criteria are met, the next issue is whether
repatriation can be effected in compliance with other obligations under
international human rights law, in particular with the former refugee's rights
to security of person, to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
and not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her
family life. So conceived, the refugee protection regime strikes an
appropriate balance between acknowledging the critical moral imperative to
shelter those who cannot safely remain in states where they face the risk of
being persecuted, and recognizing that this moral right will yield practical
protection results only if firmly anchored in an honest affirmation of states'
self-imposed limitations on their migration control authority.
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